

OPERATIONAL STUDIES
www.operationalstudies.com

Copyright © 2007

Shadow Wars:

The Future Role of Special Operations and Clandestine Warfare
in the Global War on Terrorism¹

By
Thomas B. Hunter
October 2004

“Each period has its own peculiar forms of war...each period would, therefore, also keep its own theory of war.”²

- Carl von Clausewitz, On War

Purpose

This essay is intended to discuss the implications of 9/11 on the future of warfare. Specifically, the intention is to focus on the application of limited and specific offensive force against the specter of international terrorism. This essay will not discuss developments or discussions of conventional warfare, apart from that which pertains to those aspects with applications for offensive counterterrorism. Rather, it will seek to define and explain what the author defines as “shadow war,” a type of warfare conducted by highly specialized military or paramilitary units, usually (but not necessarily) in a clandestine manner, at the direction of a government to combat threats posed by substate actors, in this case, terrorists.

Terrorism, as a term, has been variously defined by different government, agencies, and academicians.³ For purposes of this discussion, the author adopts the U.S. government definition of terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”⁴

Introduction

The international response to the attacks of 9/11 heralded in a golden age of the use of special operations forces (SOF). Similar to limited wars, such as those involving guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism requires military capabilities not typically found in conventional arsenals. Nor does the Clausewitzian principle of real war,⁵ often utilized to describe and assess conflicts between states, apply, given that terrorists are most frequently substate actors.

Therefore, the ways in which nations much confront these adversaries are many times learned as the nation experiences the conflict itself. This truism has been born out in all notable counterterrorist campaigns, such as the British experience with the Irish

Republican Army (IRA) and the Israeli efforts to contain Palestinian terrorism. In each case, nations must tailor their response to the particular conditions of the opponent. Nations must remain flexible, as there is no one solution to combating terrorism.

Much attention was paid, in the days following 9/11 to comparisons between those attacks and the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Much as Franklin Roosevelt declared war on Japan, so too did U.S. President George Bush, though this time it was not against a nation, in particular, but against an adversary without citizenship and capable of transnational travel and operations. On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared a national emergency and authorized the use of the military to “to conduct operational missions in connection with the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.”⁶

The United States and other allied nations were reminded, on a grand scale, that the enemy, al-Qaida, was capable of conducting spectacular terrorists attacks in almost any country in the world. The transnational nature of al-Qaida required a multi-phased, international response to include intelligence sharing⁷ among partner nations, new legal agreements to facilitate tracking of terrorist finances, and other unprecedented cooperative agreements. In the end, however, many of these new requirements existed to better assist those security and military forces tasked with counterterrorist operations (i.e. shadow war).

Why Shadow War?

Terrorists rarely operate from fixed bases, preferring rather to frequently change locations in order to complicate enemy targeting. This may take the form of moving from safe house to safe house in an urban environment, to crossing back and forth across mountain ranges and international borders.⁸ Such fleeting targets are generally not within the operational capabilities of conventional military forces, given the fluidity of movement and the remoteness of some terrorist operating locations.

The most notable recent exceptions to this were the August 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a suspected nerve agent factory in Sudan carried out in retaliation for the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi on Aug. 7, 1998, which killed more than 200 people, including 12 Americans.⁹ In both cases, these attacks did little, if any, real damage to the terrorists alleged to be using the Afghan camps – many of whom reportedly evacuated these facilities following the East African bombings.¹⁰ Moreover, the destruction of the “nerve agent” factory in Sudan may have indeed struck only a legitimate pharmaceutical plant, thus depriving local Sudanese of much-needed medicines and income, not to mention understandable feelings of hostility in that country against the United States.¹¹

Thus, it is clear that the war on terrorism cannot be won or even fought effectively, without the use of ground forces, bolstered with timely and *accurate* intelligence.¹² Reticence at putting “boots on the ground” in favor of maintaining political palatability at domestically and internationally results, only in, as described previously, ineffective (if visually spectacular at times) pinpricks against targets of questionable military value.¹³

Moreover, the type of military force required to effectively combat a transnational terrorist group required a unique skill set and capability that is found only in military and paramilitary special operations forces (SOF). Eminently flexible, capable of operating in overt and covert missions, and trained in the dynamics of asymmetric warfare, only SOF possess the requisite skills to carry out counterterrorist operations in denied or hostile areas, with or without the knowledge or permission of the government on whose soil the terrorists may have taken refuge.

Special Operations Forces

Military and civilian SOF units, the latter most frequently found within the security or intelligence services, are particularly well-suited to asymmetric warfare, and have proven to be the most effective tool in waging shadow war, such as that currently being waged in Afghanistan.

In order to understand the unique capabilities of SOF, it is necessary to understand the nature of special operations. Special operations are defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as, in part:

“...operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement...these operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities.”¹⁴

Special operations forces are defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as elements of the Military Services “specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.”¹⁵ While this definition is not universal among nations, it does serve to outline the unique mission and responsibilities of these units.

Those units that participate in shadow war, however, are not limited to military units, and may be drawn from security services, intelligence agencies, and other government agencies. For example, units that have participated in covert and clandestine armed actions against terrorists include the CIA Special Operations Group, French intelligence operatives, and Italian carabinieri special units.¹⁶

Shadow War in Afghanistan

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which stipulates that member nations “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...”¹⁷ With this condition satisfied, member nations were authorized to provide military assistance to the United States in defending itself against the perpetrators of the attacks.

In response, more than 30 nations sent troops to support the resolution.¹⁸ Most notable, for purposes of this discussion, is that at least sixteen of these nations sent their most elite SOF units as their representatives in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).¹⁹

Shadow War and Hostage Rescue

Special operations forces also offer a unique ability to resolve a specific category of counterterrorism: hostage rescue. Prior to the establishment of these specialized units, states were unable to respond to such actions with a viable hostage rescue capability. Those efforts made by police or conventional military forces to resolve these situations by force frequently resulted in heavy loss of life, among the terrorists, assault force, and hostages.

Hostage rescue represents a particularly interesting aspect of terrorism, in that it accomplishes what no other terrorist operation can: extended and widespread media coverage. This is particularly true in more advanced countries, where media coverage is more pervasive. It also, inherently, shows the weakness of the particular nation against which it is operating – not only via the nationality of the captive hostages, but also within the nation where the kidnapping has taken place – in that successful kidnappings can highlight the inability of a nation to protect its citizens.

Additionally, while the terrorist kidnappings of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s tended to be resolved through negotiation, the proliferation of suicide tactics among, particularly, religious extremist groups, reduces the likelihood that a given terrorist group may be truly interested in negotiation. For these reasons, it is imperative among nations that they develop a counterterrorist capability with the training and equipment necessary to resolve these situations quickly and with as little loss of life as possible.

There are myriad examples of the use of SOF in a direct action role to resolve terrorist incidents. These include:

- 1976 - Israeli commandos rescued 100 mostly Israeli and Jewish civilians taken hostage by pro-Palestinian terrorists as a result of the hijacking of an airliner that eventually landed in Entebbe, Uganda.²⁰ Notably, the operation took place over a distance of 2,500 miles, which shed a new and very public light on the capabilities of SOF in hostage rescue operations.
- 1980 - British Special Air Service (SAS) commandos successfully assaulted the Iranian Embassy in London to rescue civilians taken hostage by Iranian extremists.²¹
- 1980 - A joint American military force attempted to rescue hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but failed when several aircraft collided at a refueling site in the Iranian desert.²²
- 1997 - Peruvian special forces (civilian and military) rescued 71 hostages from the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, following a four-month long siege.²³

Here, too, SOF can also have a beneficial, if rare, effect on countering terrorism. During its operations in Northern Ireland, the SAS developed a reputation as a lethal instrument of force that would not shy away from killing in order to stop the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This reputation bore fruit in December 1975 when an IRA active service unit, which had taken refuge in a nearby flat after killing a British citizen and taking two hostages, heard over the radio that the authorities intended to send in the SAS to resolve the situation.²⁴ The four man team surrendered shortly thereafter, without firing a shot.

However, it must also be noted that, while a nation may have formed SOF units, even those allegedly trained to specialize in hostage rescue, unless these units are trained and equipped properly, their use can be undesirable. For example, in November 1985, terrorists hijacked Egypt Air Flight 648, taking all aboard hostage. The incident was highlighted by the attempted execution of an American national, whose body was then dumped onto the tarmac, in view of the international press.²⁵ Sixty people died and 38 were injured when Unit 777, the primary Egyptian counterterrorist unit, conducted a botched hostage rescue operation targeting a hijacked jetliner.

Even those units that are highly trained, such as those found in the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, France, and Germany, offer no guarantees that a given mission will be successful. In 1980, a combined special operations force attempted to rescue the hostages being held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. The force, which featured elements of the U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force, ended when a helicopter collided with a refueling aircraft, killing eight and wounding five.²⁶

Therefore, it is apparent that, while SOF can offer unique solutions to hostage situations, and offer alternative responses to states, this tool is by no means a guarantee of success, and the consequences can be catastrophic if implemented improperly or simply due to the dynamics of complex security operations.

The Genesis of Shadow War

In September 1972, terrorists of the Black September terrorist group took hostage nine Israeli athletes, demanding release of comrades in Israeli prisons. Israel refused, in keeping with national policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists. Thus, the stage was set for a hostage rescue operation.

Israel requested Germany permit the use of Israeli commandos to carry out the hostage rescue, but this was declined. Instead of taking advantage of Israel's extensive counterterrorist experience, the German authorities instead approved the deployment of police sniper teams, who were to engage the terrorists as they boarded helicopters to make their escape. The resulting firefight between the terrorists and police resulted in all nine hostages being killed, along with five of eight terrorists, the rest of who were taken into custody.

This incident was also of note due to the Israeli response, which can be said to represent the nascent reality of shadow war. Following the Munich tragedy, the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Golda Meir, concluded that those responsible would be brought to justice, using independent covert action teams.²⁷ These teams were authorized to operate worldwide, without the knowledge of the nations in which they might be expected to travel and, if necessary, conduct the assassinations. This directive was the first of its kind in the history of modern terrorism.

While this operation, designated Operation Wrath of God, did result in the elimination of all but one of the terrorists assessed as having been involved in planning the Munich operation, one incident caused an international uproar and exposing Israel's unilateral assassination campaign. In July 1973, one of the covert units mistook a Moroccan waiter for one of their wanted terrorists, and killed him on the streets of Lillehammer, Norway.²⁸ The operatives were arrested, the operation suspended (albeit, temporarily), and relations between Norway and Israel took a very public downturn.

Interestingly, despite this embarrassment, Israel may have planned a return to these transnational, extrajudicial killings.²⁹ If true, this demonstrates the high value that a state can place on the potential benefits of shadow war, despite its inherent risks.

Both the successes and failures of the Israeli response highlight not only the unique capabilities of covert action and the use of special operations forces, but also demonstrate the applicability of shadow wars to the global war on terrorism. Shadow war, as has been demonstrated, carries with it both the promise of potential elimination of dangerous terrorists, but also the danger of exposure and loss of international prestige should such operations fail publicly.

Considering Conventional War

The argument in favor of shadow war should not be considered to replace conventional warfare as the primary method of warfighting in the future. Due to its inherently limited and secretive nature, SOF are not the proper primary tool for use in waging a wider or total war, though they do have utility even in wider conflicts than the war on terrorism.

Clearly, major military conflicts will continue into the future. One need only look as far as China and the ongoing tensions involving Taiwan to realize that conventional war is as much a reality today as it was before 9/11.³⁰ Recurring conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the current war in Iraq, and fighting between some sub-Saharan African nations remind us quite clearly that wars involving states remain a viable threat to regional and international security.

With particular regard to the current war in Iraq, the proliferation of terrorists and terrorist attacks has also proven that conventional forces are not capable of responding effectively to this threat. Only through the use of SOF have coalition forces (frequently directing air strikes or conducting raids) been able to capture or kill terrorists in the field.

In this context, shadow war exists only as a subset of larger military forces, waging war where conventional wars are not possible or not desirable. With particular regard to the global war on terrorism, shadow war permits states to act against substate actors without the inherent discomforts of mobilizing and deploying main line military units. It allows states to further their anti- and counterterrorist policies, without the knowledge or understanding of the public or the enemy.

To be sure, this capability also brings with it inherent moral and ethical dilemmas, such as the need to keep a nation's populace aware of the actions (particularly military actions) of the government. However, in counterterrorism operations, such silence is generally regarded as an essential component of an effective campaign, public knowledge of which could jeopardize ongoing operations or put the lives of those waging such a war at risk. In these cases, nations must balance the public's right to know with the responsibility to keep that public safe from terrorism.

Case Study: Canada

Canada represents an excellent example of a nation's use of clandestine warfare to support national policy. While Canada did eventually deploy overt forces, such as the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry Regiment and 1 Combat Engineer Regiment,³¹ its elite,

secretive counterterrorist unit Joint Task Force Two was deployed before any other Canadian military force. Notably, this deployment took place in such secrecy, that the public revelation of this information caused considerable consternation among senior politicians, who did not appear to have been informed of the units operations in Afghanistan.³²

Only after a photographer took a long-distance photograph of JTF-2 operators escorting Taliban prisoners from the back of a US military helicopter did the Canadian government admit not only to the presence of JTF-2 in combat operations in Afghanistan,³³ but it was forced to admit, for the first time, the very existence of that unit. This led to the first official recognition of the unit, on December 17, 2003 on a permanent basis on a Canadian government website.³⁴ Moreover, the secretive nature of the unit is such that the Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, was not informed of its deployment, nor is that senior political office in the unit's chain of command.³⁵

It is noteworthy that the United States also refused to acknowledge the existence of its two primary counterterrorist units, Delta Force and SEAL Team Six.³⁶ These denials continue despite the wide public exposure to and knowledge of these forces in popular culture.³⁷

Conclusions

It is clear that SOF, used overtly or clandestinely, offer states an alternative method of warfighting, particular with regard to combating terrorism. This capability has reached its zenith in the current global war on terrorism, the global response to the 9/11 attacks, and has proven itself the only viable tool for waging war against substate actors such as terrorists, particularly those with a transnational reach (e.g. al-Qaida).

Using SOF in limited war against transnational terrorists offers a number of advantages over the use of conventional forces. These included, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Can be more politically palatable to states, especially those resistant to troop deployments, both domestically and internationally. Thus, can, to a limited extent, facilitate alliance building
2. Frequently do not require notification of the political hierarchy for deployment, thus avoiding public scrutiny and potential delays
3. Facilitates a measured response than cannot usually be exploited by an enemy (i.e. propaganda)
4. Offers a potentially very high precision military alternative to air power or larger ground forces
5. More agile and rapidly deployable than any other military force. Enables rapid reaction to perishable intelligence.

The use of these forces is not a panacea, however, and there are potential disadvantages to their use:

1. Exposes the force to high risk missions, with the inherent risk of casualties to friendly forces
2. May increase domestic political unrest if clandestine troop activity is discovered.
3. Can reveal capabilities not previously made public

4. No guarantee of success, especially in hostage rescue scenarios, with the potential not only for friendly loss of life, but also of widespread condemnation and/or bad press in the event of failure

Thus, we can see that, while there are distinct advantages and disadvantages to the use of SOF in combating terrorism, these military and paramilitary units represent the most viable tool in a state's inventory. Conventional forces are incapable of carrying out an effective campaign, given the elusive nature of the enemy, as has been borne out numerous times.

In the case of al-Qaida, and the events surrounding the attacks of 9/11, some nations have elected to make use of their own overt and covert capabilities, likely with the knowledge that attacks on that scale may not be limited to targets in the United States. So, for those nations, the risks are clearly within acceptable limits, lest the terrorists take advantage of the well-known limitations of conventional forces.

Shadow war, which can briefly be defined as the use of SOF in overt or covert action, will remain the most effective form of warfare in the future, with specific regard to combating terrorism. It will, it must be noted, never replace conventional war, which will undoubtedly continue into the foreseeable future, if history is any guide. Rather, shadow war, which has come into its own since 9/11, will remain the weapon of choice for nations seeking to carry the fight to the terrorists, rather than relying on more passive measures to keep their populations safe.

Copyright © 2007

Appendix A

International Special Operations Forces deployed in support of counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan (to include those nations taking part in ISAF), 2001-2004³⁸

Austria	Combined unit made up of elements of the 25 th Jägerbataillon and Zentrum Jagdkampf
Federal Republic of Germany	Kommando Spezial Kräfte (KSK)
Denmark	Jegerkommandoen Marinejegerkommandoen
Sweden	JaegerKorpset FrömandsKorpset
France	Elements of the Commandement des Operations Speciales (COS) and Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM)
Italy	9 th Airborne Assault Regiment "Col. Moschin"
United Kingdom	22 Special Air Service (SAS) Special Boat Service (SBS)
New Zealand	Special Air Service (NZSAS)
Norway	MarineJegerne Fallskjermjegerkommandoen
Netherlands	13 th Infantry Battalion Stoottroepen
Romania	Special Forces
Poland	Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno Mobilnego (GROM)
Turkey	Special Forces Mountain Brigade
Canada	Joint Task Force Two (JTF-2)
Australia	Special Air Service Regiment (SASR)
United States*	US Air Force Pararescue, Combat Controllers, and fixed and rotary wing assets US Navy SEALs US Army Rangers US Army Special Forces Delta Force SEAL Team Six USAF Combat Controllers 160 th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) CIA Special Operations Group (SOG)

* The number, variety, and secrecy of US SOF deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom preclude a complete listing. The list of units provided in this appendix, however, represent a good example of the major U.S. and international units involved.

Selected Bibliography

- Bassford, Christopher, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Buckley, Mary, and Fawn, Rick, Global Responses to Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2003)
- Clancy, Tom, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (USA: Berkeley Publishing Group, 2003),
- Clark, General Wesley K., Waging Modern War (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002)
- Clausewitz, Carl von, On War (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997)
- Conboy, Kenneth, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (USA: Paladin Press, 1995).
- Connor, Ken, Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS (London: Cassell, 1998)
- Corbin, Jane, The Base: Al-Qaida and the Changing Face of Global Terror (Great Britain: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 2003)
- Cox, Sebastian, and Gray, Peter (eds.), Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2002)
- Franks, General Tommy, American Soldier (USA: Regan Books, 2004)
- Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al-Qaida: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst and Company, 2002)
- Harclerode, Peter, Fighting Dirty: The Inside Story of Covert Operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama bin Ladin (London: Cassell, 2001)
- Howard, Russell D., and Sawyer, Reid L. (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (USA: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002)
- Kegley, Charles W., The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003)
- Laquer, Walter, (ed.) Voices of Terror (Canada: Reed Press, 2004)
- Mosher, Steven W., Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).
- Netanyahu, Iddo, Entebbe: A Defining Moment in the War on Terrorism (USA: New Leaf Press, 2003).
- O'Sullivan (ed.), Noel, Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution: The Origins of Political Violence (Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1986)

- Pflug, Jackie, Miles to Go Before I Sleep: A Survivor's Story of Life After a Terrorist Hijacking (USA: Hazelden Information & Educational Services, 2002).
- Pillar, Paul R., Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001)
- Pugliese, David, Canada's Secret Commandos (Canada: Esprit de Corps, 2002)
- Rowan, Brian, Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press Limited, 1995)
- Ryan, Mike, Special Operations in Iraq (Great Britain: Pen and Sword Military, 2004)
- Stevenson, William, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (USA: Bantam Books, 1976)
- Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000)
- Turner, Stansfield, Terrorism & Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991)
- Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism: British Perspectives (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993)

¹ The term "shadow war" has been applied to a number of various topics; however, for the purposes of this essay, the author adopts the term to apply to a category of warfare conducted by specialized military or paramilitary units, usually in a clandestine manner, at the direction of a government. This essay seeks to define "shadow war" as a formal concept of limited war, rather than as a general concept of unconventional war, as presented in other publications. Other publications that have discussed the term "shadow war" in this context include David Pugliese, Shadow Wars: Special Forces in the New Battle Against Terrorism (Esprit de Corps Books: New Jersey, 2002), Tom Clancy, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (USA: Berkeley Publishing Group, 2003), Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (USA: Paladin Press, 1995).

² Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1977): 350. The author would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Christopher Bassford, National Defense University, and author of Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1994), with regard to research into the writings of Clausewitz as referred in this essay.

³ See, for example, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. The New Global Terrorism (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 2003) and Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (McGraw-Hill: USA, 2002) for examples of the complexities involved in defining terrorism.

⁴ See Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d).

⁵ While a detailed examination of Clausewitzian theory is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief discussion is warranted here. He defines war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." (On War, p.5) This concept is accepted in this discussion of shadow war, as it does not violate the principles of how limited war is waged. Limited war, for purposes of this discussion, being wars with limited goals and objectives utilizing military force tailored to the limited threat. Where shadow war differs from Clausewitz's concepts of war is in that his theory focuses on states warring against states, and the myriad complexities inherent therein. And while numerous select concepts of Clausewitzian theory do apply to shadow war, it can be argued that he did not live in a time in which terrorism was a global threat, and that the primary focus (appropriately so) was on these state vs. state conflicts.

⁶ This directive was contained in a Presidential Memo to the Congress of the United States, September 14, 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-6.html>

⁷ It should be noted here that intelligence sharing, while certainly a desirable goal, is only effective if the quality of intelligence that is shared is of value, accurate, and timely. As noted in the 9/11 Commission's *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, intelligence sharing, even among U.S. intelligence agencies was poor. Thus, it comes as no surprise that a major overhaul, as outlined in the Commission's report, was a cornerstone of its recommendations for future improvements. A summary of these recommendations can be found on the Commission's official website. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm

⁸ Examples of these tactics are well documented. See Richard Gillespie, "The Urban Guerrilla in Latin America", in Noel O'Sullivan (ed.), *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution: The Origins of Political Violence* (Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1986): 150-177; Charles Townshend, "The Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-1921", in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), *Terrorism: British Perspectives* (England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993): 118-145.

⁹ On August 20, 1998, US President William Clinton announced at both a press conference and in an address from the White House that the attacks were conducted to target al-Qaida and Osama bin Ladin in retaliation specifically for the truck bomb attacks that targeted the US embassies. See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec98/clinton1_8-20.html, and http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec98/clinton2_8-20.html. Interestingly, General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated on that same day that the strikes were not "...simply a response to some specific act, but a concerted effort to defend U.S. citizens and our interests around the globe against a very real and very deadly terrorist threat." http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/1998/t08201998_t820brfg.html.

¹⁰ CNN.com, "Sources: Terrorist Base Camp Evacuated After Embassy Bombings," August 13, 1999, <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9808/13/bombing.bin.laden/>

¹¹ See Jonathan Belke, "Years Later, US Attack on Factory Still Hurts Sudan", *Boston Globe*, August 22, 1999: F2. Additionally, in May 1999 the US government removed the freeze it had previously placed on the finances of the owner of the pharmaceutical plant, which Sudanese officials have described as tactic acknowledgement of erroneous US targeting. See BBC News Online "Sudan: US Mistaken in Bombing," May 5, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/335821.stm>

¹² The author acknowledges the argument that terrorism, as an international plague, can never be defeated via warfare alone, hence definitions as to what victory might entail are vague, at best. Defining victory in the "global war on terrorism" is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it is proper to state here that the focus of shadow war is to combat terrorism, via the use of international SOF units, around the world. The specific focus in this type of warfare is the killing or arrest of dangerous terrorists with the purpose of preventing them from planning or conducting terrorist operations against friendly nations.

¹³ This is not to say that visually spectacular military operations do not have military value, particularly with regard to deterrence. In fact, the U.S.-led bombing campaign conducted in Baghdad, Iraq in March 2002 was clearly intended to influence the Iraqi leadership and military. In the autobiography of U.S. Central Command's Commander in Chief, Gen. Tommy Franks, he noted the visual effects of the "Shock and Awe" campaign and its impact on the international media. *American Soldier* (USA: Regan Books, 2004): 479-481.

Additionally, video footage taken during the testing of the U.S. military's largest conventional bomb, known as the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), was readily provided to the press in the days leading up to the war in Iraq. The provision of the video was followed by a comment from U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who, in response to a question regarding the use of the MOAB as a psychological weapon, stated, "There is a psychological component to all aspects of warfare. The goal is to not have a war. The goal is to have the pressure be so great that Saddam Hussein cooperates. Short of that, an unwillingness to cooperate, the goal is to have the capabilities of the coalition so clear and so obvious that there is an enormous disincentive for the Iraqi military to fight against the coalition, and there's an enormous incentive for Saddam Hussein to leave and spare the world a conflict." Department of Defense news briefing, March 11, 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03112003_t0311sd.html

¹⁴ *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, April 12, 2001 (as amended through 9 June 2004): 494. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

¹⁵ Ibid: 494-495.

-
- ¹⁶ Eric Micheletti, Special Forces: War in Terrorism in Afghanistan (Paris: Histiore & Collections, 2003).
- ¹⁷ <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm#Art05>
- ¹⁸ NATO Update: Personnel by Region. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/02-february/e0209b.htm>
- ¹⁹ See Appendix A.
- ²⁰ See William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (USA: Bantam Books, 1976) and Iddo Netanhayu, Entebbe: A Defining Moment in the War on Terrorism (country: New Leaf Press, 2003).
- ²¹ See BBC online resource, "1980: SAS Rescue Ends Embassy Siege," http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/5/newsid_2510000/2510873.stm
- ²² James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander (USA: Ballantine Books, 2002).
- ²³ See BBC online resource, "1 Hostage Killed in Daring Peru Rescue." <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/22/peru.update.late/>, and CNN online resource, "Peru, Japan relieved by hostage rescue." <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/23/peru/>.
- ²⁴ Ken Connor, Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS (London: Cassell, 1998): 320-321.
- ²⁵ Jackie Pflug, Miles to Go Before I Sleep: A Survivor's Story of Life After a Terrorist Hijacking (USA: Hazelden Information & Educational Services, 2002).
- ²⁶ See James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander (USA: Ballantine Books, 2002) and Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (USA: Naval Institute Press, 1985).
- ²⁷ Alexander Calahan, "Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams," Master's degree thesis, submitted to the Faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 1995. <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/calahan.htm>
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Richard Sale, "Israel to Kill in U.S., Allied Nations," Unired Press International, January 15, 2003. <http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030115-035849-6156r>
- ³⁰ See Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).
- ³¹ A complete list of Canadian military forces assigned to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can be found at the Canadian Defense Force official website. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/Athena/index_e.asp
- ³² This information was derived from transcripts taken during Canada's 37th Parliament, 1st Session, February 2, 2002. http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/145_2002-02-20/ques145-E.htm.
- ³³ Laura Bracken, "Guantanamo Captives Need Protection," *The Toronto Star*, February 1, 2002: 17.
- ³⁴ Official Canadian government information regarding JTF-2 can be found on the country's official National Defense website. http://www.forcesx.gc.ca/dcds/units/jtf2/default_e.asp.
- ³⁵ Information discussing JTF-2's chain of command and lack of reporting on the unit's movements to senior government officials was widely covered in the Canadian media, as well as in formal parliamentary discussions. See CBC News Online, "JTF2: Canada's Super Secret Commandos," March 2, 2004; and http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/145_2002-02-20/ques145-E.htm.
- ³⁶ While the Department of Defense has refused to publicly name these units, there have been rare incidents of tacit acknowledgement. For example, on September 13, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in response to a query from reporters as to whether Delta Force members would be used to train new air marshals, stated, "...It doesn't require all the exotic training that Delta Force members have." http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09132001_t0913dsd.html. Typical responses by government and military leaders to questions about these units are most commonly met with evasion or denial. See, for example, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11052001_t1105st1.html and http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t10202001_t1020jcs.html.
- ³⁷ For example, the role of Delta Force in the battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 was highlighted in both a best-selling book by Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (Penguin: 2000) and an Academy Award-winning film, similarly titled *Black Hawk Down*. Moreover, the founding commander of the unit, US Army Col. Charles Beckwith, wrote his own book about the unit, Delta Force: The Army's

Elite Counterterrorist Unit (Avon: 2000). Myriad other books, magazines, and video games have also profiled and discussed these units.

³⁸ This list was derived from a variety of sources, including Eric Micheletti, Special Forces: War in Terrorism in Afghanistan (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2003) and David Pugliese, Canada's Secret Commandos (Canada: Esprit de Corps, 2002).

Copyright © 2007